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Abstract 
I develop a model of growth based on three assumptions: first, a variety of technologies 
characterised by different degrees of labour skill intensity, where technological change is localized; 
second, agents are boundedly rational, and the aggregate rule of motion of their behaviour follows a 
replicator dynamics; third, markets do not clear instantaneously, with prices adjusting gradually. For 
simplicity, I study the case of two technologies and two labour markets, one for skilled and one for 
unskilled labour.  
The model is investigated by means of local stability and computer numerical analysis. Two types of 
steady states obtain, each characterised by the complete specialization of production into one of the two 
technologies. Convergence towards the low-growth steady state, associated with the unskilled labour 
intensive technology, occurs under adverse structural conditions, such as marked initial skill shortage 
and high skill upgrade costs. This result of lock-in to the inferior steady state is interpreted as co-
ordination failure, in that market forces do not always provide sufficient incentives to ensure a high-
growth path. 
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1  Introduction 
In the past few years, the search for new insights in growth theory has intensified under the 
pressure of the so-called convergence controversy, i.e. the empirical debate over the pattern of 
convergence, if any, of per capita income levels across countries. After common agreement has been 
reached over the rejection of the absolute convergence hypothesis (e.g. Barro (1991)), efforts have 
focussed on testing the validity of the conditional convergence hypothesis, which maintains that per 
capita incomes of countries sharing the same structural characteristics, e.g. preferences, technologies, 
population growth and government policies, etc., should converge to the same level regardless of their 
initial conditions. Evidence has been gathered that conditional convergence holds, but is slow, being 
about 2% per year (e.g. Mankiw, et al. (1992), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995)).  
However, not only do some researchers question the validity of such evidence, calling for the use of 
different econometric techniques (e.g. Durlauf et al. (2001), Quah (1997)), but they also doubt that this 
is the really interesting issue to address (e.g. Azariadis and Drazen (1990), Quah (1996)). When we face 
such striking differences in per capita incomes across countries as we observe in the real world, the 
dramatic question is not whether or not poor countries converge to their own level of steady states, but 
what causes such steady state levels to be so low. Consequently, a sense of dissatisfaction with the neo-
classical Solow model, in which steady states are essentially exogenously determined, led to various 
refinements of both the neo-classical and endogenous-growth approach. What all of these refinements 
have in common is the notion of multiple steady states, i.e. the simultaneous presence of two, or more, 
equilibria, one of which involves a long-run per capita income growth rate that is lower than the 
other(s). This equilibrium may be called a poverty trap1, and its empirical counterpart is the so-called 
club-convergence hypothesis: per capita income of countries that are identical in their structural 
characteristics converge to the same level provided that their initial conditions belong to the basin of 
attraction of the same steady-state equilibrium (Galor (1996)).  
There are many reasons why multiple steady states may occur. In a Solow-setting, it suffices to 
introduce heterogeneity across individuals, and different propensities to save out of interest and labour 
income in order to imply multiple steady states (Galor (1996)). In overlapping generation models, the 
role of human capital has received much attention. On the one hand, some authors have stressed the 
social increasing returns to scale from capital accumulation, either because of the positive externalities 
brought about by individual human capital (Lucas (1988)), or because of some threshold effects in 
technical progress (Azariadis and Drazen (1990)). Others have focussed on the constraints on individual 
capital formation stemming from capital market imperfections, especially in the presence of income 
inequality (e.g. Aghion et al. (1999), Aghion and Bolton (1997), Galor and Zeira (1993)), or local 
externalities (e.g. Durlauf (1996), Benabou (1996)). Closely related is the issue of the impact of financial 
institutions on growth (e.g. Banerjee and Newman (1998)). Another account hinges more directly on the 
distribution of income, especially through politico-economic channels: higher inequality lowers the 
median income position thus bringing about higher tax rates and lower growth (Persson and Tabellini 
(1994)); or, an initially low level of wealth may generate social conflict, thus hampering the chances of 
catching up (e.g. Benhabib and Rustichini (1996)). Other causes of multiple steady states include 
endogenous fertility (e.g. Galor and Weil (1996)).  
As emphasised by Bernard and Jones (1996), however, very few of the explanations provided focus 
on technology, despite its undoubted importance for growth, but rather insist on capital accumulation 
                                                 
1 There exists another notion of poverty trap in the literature, which is associated with the persistence of an individuals 
position in the income distribution rather than with aggregate variables. Under this definition, a poverty trap is a state in 
which dynasties starting out with income below a threshold, converge to a low-level of income, whereas others converge to 
a high-level (e.g., Moav, 2002, Durlauf (1996)). However, in this paper I will always refer to the concept of poverty trap 
given in the text.  
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as the privileged factor in accounting for income disparities: in the words of Romer (1993), ‘object gaps’ 
seem to count more than ‘idea gaps’ for students of development. However, some studies have 
emphasised how technology gaps amongst countries do seem to occur in reality (Bernard and Jones 
(1996)), and have put forward theoretical explanations for this fact, which hinge on a country’s 
institutional and economic structure as possible barriers to the adoption of the ‘leading-edge’ technology 
(Parente and Prescott (1994)). The so-called “appropriate technology” approach has systematically taken 
this view, emphasising the necessity of a “good match” between the technology adopted and the specific 
structural characteristics of an economy (e.g. Basu and Weil (1998)). For instance, if the frontier 
technology is produced in advanced countries, and this is designed for the use by skilled workers, then 
developing countries, which can only rely on unskilled workers, cannot exploit technical advances and 
bridge the gap with the most advanced ones (Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001)). Other research, rather 
than focussing on comparative issues, have modelled technology and industrial structure as key factors 
in orientating the growth path of an economy. In particular, the role of demand spillovers across the 
various sectors of an economy have been indicated as crucial in making it possible the ‘take-off’ from a 
state of low to one of high growth (Murphy, et al. (1989)). Analogously, focussing on the supply side, 
localized technological complementarities amongst industrial sectors can determine multiple steady 
states, and the presence of some leading sectors can again trigger a take-off process (Durlauf (1993)). 
Another approach in which technical change is seen as the main dynamic engine of evolution for 
the economic system, is developed within so-called “evolutionary economics” (e.g. Nelson and Winter 
(1982), Hodgson (1999)). Its methodology is different from the approaches illustrated above, in that it 
takes on bounded rationality, and an off-equilibrium standpoint, rather than optimising agents and 
market equilibrium. Indeed, selection, rather than equilibrium, is the main conceptual tool of analysis 
employed (Dosi and Nelson (1993)). Multiple equilibria can occur here because of the path-dependency 
of economic systems, which arise from the cognitive and informational limits of agents and from the 
cumulative characteristics typical of many economic processes and technical change in particular (e.g. 
Dosi et al (1988)). 
This discussion sets the framework of analysis of this paper. The main goal is to develop a model of 
growth where technical change and the structural conditions of an economy occupy the centre-stage of 
analysis as the main dynamic engines for the economic system. Moreover, I also adopt methodological 
assumptions rather similar to those employed in evolutionary economics, in that the process of 
adjustment towards market equilibrium and individual optimality is only gradual, and exchanges take 
place outside equilibrium. Therefore, in this setting multiple steady states and lock-in effects arise 
through channels different from those emphasised in ‘mainstream’ growth theory, specifically as a failure 
of the co-ordinating power of the market forces in driving the economic system towards an efficient 
outcome. The “neo-classical” case of instantaneous adjustment and full individual rationality is a limit 
case of the model presented here, and its implications are commented on. 
As pointed out, the main characteristic of the model lies in the particular view of technical change 
that is adopted. In fact, both neo-classical and ‘new’ Growth Theory generally deals with technical 
change of the general purpose type, i.e. one capable of affecting the whole set of productive techniques. 
Indeed, it is this assumption that justifies the common representation of technical change as a uniform 
shift of the isoquants of the production function towards the origin. Instead, I take on the notion of 
localized technical change, which was originally put forward by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1969) and Salter 
(1969), and which has also been recently adopted by both the “appropriate technology” approach and 
the “evolutionary economics” approach. The basic idea behind localized technical change is that an 
innovation is generally capable of affecting only a limited subset of techniques, with general purpose 
technologies being a limiting case. This corresponds to the shift of some segments, or even single points, 
of the isoquant towards the origin, rather than taking for granted that the entire isoquant shifts. 
Furthermore, I will focus on a structural factor sometimes overlooked in both evolutionary and 
mainstream approaches - namely the composition of the workforce in terms of its skill attainment. More 
precisely, labour is not considered homogenous, that is directly employable into all of the productive  
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activities, rather the different technologies are constrained to employ only labour with a particular level 
of skill. In particular, two technologies are available, one of which is skilled whereas the other is unskilled 
labour intensive. Technical change is then made up of an exogenous and an endogenous component. 
The former advantages the skilled-intensive technique, whereas the latter makes individual productivity 
growth rates depend on the degree of concentration of economic activities in that technique. The reason 
is that technical knowledge is a public good at the individual technique level, but not at the economy-
wide level, since knowledge spillovers can occur only amongst firms adopting the same technique.  
This is the key characteristic causing the whole process of technical change to be cumulative, in the 
sense that a higher level of concentration within a sector makes the associated technique increasingly 
attractive to firms. Most importantly, this is also what possibly causes the economy to be stuck in a slow-
growth trap: although the skilled labour intensive technique ceteris paribus brings about faster 
productivity growth rates, whenever the structural conditions of the economy are initially adverse to its 
development (e.g. because of skill shortage within the workforce) the economy will concentrate its 
activities into the other technique, thus precluding the possibility of catching-up. Therefore, in the 
model, low and high-growth steady states are identified as situations in which all of the productive 
factors, i.e. capital and labour, are allocated into the unskilled and the skilled intensive technology 
respectively. On the grounds of local stability analysis and of numerical computer analysis, it is shown 
that the economic system always converges towards one of these steady states; in particular, the steady 
state characterised by a balanced growth path between the two sectors can be proven to be unstable. The 
main contribution of the paper lies in the analysis of the economic conditions that determine the 
convergence towards one rather than the other steady state, of the path of convergence, and of the 
particular characteristics of the steady states thus obtained.   
The resulting model has a flavour similar to evolutionary work dealing with the question of the 
contest between technologies, mainly that introduced by Arthur (1985), within a urn-scheme stochastic 
process, and also Durlauf (1993) and Corradi and Ianni (2000) in the context of a spatial-temporal 
analysis. These models prove the non-ergodicity of stochastic systems, thus presenting multiple 
equilibria and lock-in of inefficient outcomes as possible long-run steady states. It is also similar to other 
work that analyses the rise and extinction of different technologies and their impact on the 
macroeconomic performance of the economy, such as Nelson and Winter (1982), Verspagen (1993), 
Silverberg and Verspagen (1994). However, the present model is distinct from many of these 
contributions in that the final outcome is not merely due to random factors, but to underlying causes in 
labour markets dynamics and the pattern of technical change.  
The model also relates to Baumol’s analysis of the unbalanced development of the economy (1967), 
although in his approach the demand side of the economy is seen as the crucial determinant of the 
unevenness of the growth path, whereas in the present model I focus on the supply side. Furthermore, 
each of the sectors that composes the economy is modelled like Goodwin’s single-sector model of 
growth (1967). Finally, some links with the “appropriate technology” approach are also evident, as the 
slow-growth steady state can be interpreted as a mismatch between the structure of the economy, and in 
particular its workforce composition, and the advanced technology. 
The basic structure of the model is introduced in section 2: this is composed of two parts, one 
related to the sphere of production, where the notions of the pair of available technologies (section 2.1), 
of their productivity growth rates (section 2.2), and of the rules of capital accumulation (section 2.3) are 
outlined. The second part describes the dynamics of the labour market (section 2.4). Given the off-
equilibrium nature of the model, it is also necessary to specify the behaviour of the economy in the 
recurrent situations of imbalances and rationing in the market (section 2.5).  
The first version of the model, characterised by the impossibility of workers changing their initial 
type of skill, is presented in section 3. After an illustration of the economic forces driving the evolution 
of the model (section 3.1), an analysis of the local stability of its possible steady states is carried out 
(section 3.2). This turns out to be inconclusive, given the non-generic nature of the system of differential 
equations. Therefore, the results of a numerical analysis of the evolution of the system is presented. Not  
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only does this allow us to discuss the final outcome of the evolution of the model, in terms of 
convergence towards one of the two technologies, but also it enables an analysis of the path actually 
followed by the economy along this process. Section 3.3.1 presents a scenario of lock-in towards the 
unskilled intensive technique when the skill shortage in the workforce is particularly marked, while 
section 3.3.2 shows how this result is reversed when the initial skill composition is even slightly 
modified in favour of skilled labour. 
Section 4 studies a second and more general version of the model that allows the possibility of 
mobility of the workforce between the two sectors. In section 4.1 the presence of mobility costs for the 
workers is modelled, and section 4.3 shows how both outcomes of convergence towards the techniques 
are possible: in particular I focus on how reducing the mobility costs associated with skill upgrading 
determines the convergence to the low-growth steady state to the high-growth one. Section 5 draws out 
some conclusions, leaving a discussion of the mathematical details of the model to the Appendix. 
2  The basic structure of the model 
2.1  Production 
Consider a market for a homogenous good Q, where two different techniques, differing upon their 
labour skill-intensity, are available to firms. For simplicity, I suppose that the first technique exclusively 
adopts skilled labour, while the second only employs unskilled labour. Each technique is uniquely 
determined by the pair of coefficients expressing the requirements of capital and labour per unit of 
output, so that a different pair of coefficients of production per se implies a different technique2. 
Nevertheless, as I shall elaborate in the next section, although the production coefficients of a technique 
are fixed in an instant of time, they may change over time as an effect of technical change. The two 
techniques of production can thus be represented by a fixed coefficient Leontief production function: 
1,2 , min =
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ = i
c
K
L a Q
i
i i i         (1) 
where L1 and K1 represents the employment of skilled labour and capital in the skill-intensive technique, 
and L2 and K2 the amount of unskilled labour and capital employed in the unskilled-intensive one. c is 
the fixed coefficient of the content of capital in one unit of output, assumed to be equal for the two 
technologies, and ai is labour productivity. Obviously, total production is given by: Q=Q1+Q2. 
This model can also be thought of as representing the whole of the economy. In this framework, Q 
is the aggregate bundle made up of two commodities produced in the two main industrial sectors of the 
economy, which employ techniques, or, rather, technologies
3, differing as to their labour skill-intensity. The 
sector employing the skilled labour intensive technology thereby represents an advanced hi-tech 
industry, whereas the other is a “traditional” low-tech sector. In order for Q to be a sound concept in 
this setting, one also needs to assume that the relative prices of the goods remain constant over time, for 
instance because of infinite elasticity of their demands. In a neo-classical framework, free entry into each 
sector and arbitrage conditions guarantee that the sectors grow at equal rates, thus making it possible to 
abstract away from individual outputs and to consider the aggregate of the two. In the present context, 
however, given the off-equilibrium approach, it may be possible that sectors grow at different rates even 
in a steady state, a characteristic which is usually referred to as unbalanced growth.  
                                                 
2 Dealing with only two techniques of production, rather than the continuum of techniques that would make up a typical 
“neoclassical” isoquant of production, precludes marginal substitutability of inputs, enabling firms to operate only a 
discrete choice between the two available techniques. This characterisation is consistent with indivisibilities in the 
production process (Antonelli, 1995). 
3 The term technology seems more suitable to dealing with industrial sectors rather than technique. However, I will 
consider the two as substantial synonymous.   
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Given the close correspondence between the two cases presented, in the following sections the 
terms technique and technology will be used interchangeably, and the term sector will represent at the 
same time the segment of a market employing one of the two techniques in the single market version of 
the model, or the industry adopting a certain technology in the aggregate version. 
2.2  Technical change 
As pointed out in section 1, the account of technical change that will be developed is of the 
localized type; that is, two independent laws of motion of technical advance will be set out for the two 
different techniques. Furthermore, technical change will depend upon an endogenous and an exogenous 
factor. Let us deal with the first factor. 
Some notable economists, (e.g. Arrow (1962), Paul Romer (1994)), have emphasised the non-rival 
nature and the -at least partial- non-excludability of innovations. In fact, although there are many ways 
whereby firms can temporally appropriate the benefits deriving from an innovation, we can expect that 
in the long run a large amount, if not all, of the knowledge associated with a technical innovation will be 
spread over the rest of the economy. An opposite view is taken by economists of the evolutionary area 
(e.g. Dosi (1988)) who argue that the nature of technological knowledge is largely tacit, thus, at least to 
some extent, appropriable by firms. According to this view, even in the long run can first-innovators 
still keep their “technological lead” from the followers. Consequently, the scope of the phenomenon of 
technical spillovers throughout the whole of the economy would be limited. 
In the present specification I take on an intermediate position between those two views, arguing 
that technical information spillovers take place at the level of the individual technique, but not at the 
economy-wide level. In other words, technical information is a public good only at the technique-
specific level, in particular because innovations carried out by a firm adopting a certain technique can be 
imitated by firms employing the same technique, but not from those using the other. For simplicity, the 
imitation process is assumed to be instantaneous. An analogous interpretation of this idea would be that 
firms belonging to the same sector of the economy create a “net” through which technical information 
is transmitted amongst them (e.g. Antonelli (1995), Maurseth and Verspagen (1999)).  
No explanation is given in the model about how and why such innovations are carried out, and the 
R&D variable is then omitted. However, it is assumed that the larger the share of firms active in a 
certain sector, the higher the probability that an innovation is carried out. That is, applying the large 
numbers law, the growth rate of technical change depends positively on the density of activity in a 
certain sector, which is measured  by the share of capital invested therein. Finally, technical change is 
assumed to be of the labour-augmenting type. 
The following equation summarises all these considerations. It describes the rule of motion of 
labour productivity for each technique: 
i i
i
i g
a
a
k =
•           (2) 
where ki is the share of capital invested in technique i : 
K
Ki
i = k           (3) 
g1 and g2  are fixed parameters satisfying the following condition:  
  2 1 g g >            (4) 
The fact that ai depends on ki captures the endogenous factor of technical change: the larger the 
concentration of economic activity in technique i, the larger the technique-specific innovation rate4,5. 
                                                 
4 In Grimalda (2001), some evidence has been collected confirming this relation: in particular, the manufacturing sectors 
have been classified in four groups on the grounds of their technological intensity, in accordance with OECD (1997). 
Hence, for a sample of OECD countries, the productivity within each group, normalised for a country’s average 
productivity, can be shown to depend positively on their value added share, with respect to manufacturing value added.  
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The parameters gi, instead, portray the exogenous factor of technical change, which is usually thought of as 
being linked with the rate of advance in scientific discoveries. In fact, many scholars of the subject 
emphasise the essential role of growth in general scientific knowledge to bring about technological 
innovations: this acts as the ultimate determinant and as a constraint to the technological knowledge 
present in an economic system (Rosenberg (1982)). The fact that science mainly evolves independently 
from economic activity makes it an exogenous factor of development6. Condition (4) takes account of 
the evidence that skilled labour intensive techniques have in the last decades been more efficient than 
unskilled intensive ones, particularly because of the complementarity between information technology 
and skilled labour (Berman et al. (1998)). In the present model, this is equivalent to saying that scientific 
discoveries are more easily applicable to technique 1. This implies that technique 1 has a higher potential 
for growth, in the sense that economic growth is higher when productive factors are entirely allocated in 
the skilled intensive technique rather than in the unskilled intensive one. Therefore, steady states 
characterised by entire allocation of factors within the skilled-intensive technique will carry out higher 
growth rates than alternative steady states. 
2.3  Capital accumulation 
2.3.1   Rule of motion of aggregate capital 
Since two productive sectors are present, we need two different laws of motion of capital: one 
refers to the aggregate level of capital accumulation whereas the other shows how capital distributes 
between the two sectors. In what follows, we shall assume that there exists a continuum of firms, so that 
the dimension of each of them is negligible. Moreover, each firm possesses one (infinitesimal) unit of 
capital, which can be invested in either technique. The following are aggregate relations, which can 
nevertheless be accounted for in terms of sensible individual behaviours. Let us first introduce some 
variables: 
K=K1+K2             (5) 
r
K
Q w L
K
w
a
c
i
i i i i
i
i
i ” ”
-
=
-
p
1
        (6) 
r r r = + k k 1 1 2 2          (7) 
Equation (5) defines the aggregate level of capital as the sum of the amount of capital invested in each 
technique. ri describes the individual profit rate, and r is the overall rate of profit obtained by weighing 
the individual profit rates with the respective capital shares. Let us call yi  the cost of labour per unit of 
output produced: 
y
w
a
i
i
i
”           (8) 
                                                                                                                                                                  
This supports the view that economic systems specialising in a particular technology, or industrial sector, in terms of their 
value added share, also experience higher productivity growth rates.  
5 It can be noticed that the specification of the endogenous component of technical progress comprises a negative externality 
between firms active in different sectors: not only does a firm leaving a technique for the other increase the productivity in 
the new sector, but also it decreases that of the previous sector. Indeed, a relation consistent with the theoretical 
considerations previously set out should make the productivity growth dependent on the absolute level of capital present in 
a sector, rather than on its relative value. However, the specification adopted can be justified on grounds of analytical 
tractability, and in any case it does not affect the results of the model, since, as we shall see in section 2.3, the choice of the 
firm as to their location in the technology scale is based on the relative profitability of the two techniques. 
6 I proved that other specifications of the productivity equations, e.g. a linear equation in g and k, lead to the same results 
as the one adopted; in general, though, I cannot provide a general proof of the robustness of the results.   
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Then, we can write a compact expression for the technique-specific rate of profit: 
r
y
c
i
i =
- 1
          (9) 
The share of total labour income is thus given by the following expression: 
y y y ” + k k 1 1 2 2          (10) 
As for consumption and investment behaviour, in order to avoid technical complexities I simply assume 
that at each instant of time workers spend a constant share of their income, for simplicity set equal to 
one, in consumption, and firms reinvest a constant proportion of their profits, assumed equal to one as 
well7. Therefore, the overall flow of investments coincide with the amount of profits in a period, and the 
proportional growth rate of aggregate capital is equal to the rate of profit: 
K
K
r
y y
c
•
= =
- - 1 1 1 2 2 k k
        (11) 
2.3.2  Rule of motion of individual capital  
I now specify the macroeconomic evolution of the system for what concerns the distribution of 
capital across technologies, based on the assumptions of boundedly rational behaviour at the individual 
level. The specification that will be adopted draws on a model that has been put forward in the 
evolutionary literature (Silverberg and Verspagen (1994)), which captures the idea that adjustments 
towards optimality can occur only slowly because of informational and/or cognitive constraints on the 
agents. Equation (12) describes the sectoral growth rate of capital: 
K
K
r r r
i
i
i i
•
= + - a( )   a>0        (12) 
This equation is similar to equation (11) in its first component, in that capital accumulation in sector i 
depends on the amount of profits made by firms active therein, which, in accordance with the behaviour 
assumed in the previous section, are immediately reinvested: this is the “normal” rate of accumulation ri, 
that is. However, the second component takes into account the possibility that firms switch towards the 
technique that is currently more profitable, thus making its growth rate higher. Adjustment costs are 
assumed to be negligible. Such a second component is consistent with a bounded rational behaviour, in 
that only the extreme case of a equal to infinity does correspond with the situation of instantaneous 
adjustment to optimality. In all of the other cases, at each instant of time only a part of the firms switch 
to the more advantageous technique, at a rate that is proportional to the extent of the profitability 
difference. Therefore, a may be seen as an index of the “amount” of information available to agents. 
Instead, the term expressing the relative profitability between techniques is justified on the grounds of 
agents’ cognitive limits: a higher difference in relative profitability implies a faster flow of firms, the idea 
being that firms can in this case spell out more easily the available information and thus move in the 
‘right’ direction8.  
                                                 
7 Notice that nothing would be lost by setting the propensities to consume and invest at a level less than one. This 
assumption is common to models of the Kaldorian tradition, which, more generally, assumed that the saving propensity of 
firms was higher than that of consumers. In models of neo-classical growth, the same result of constant propensity to save 
obtains, but in that case the horizon span is infinite. 
8 To be sure, the two aspects of information and cognitive ability are interrelated between one another: agents with more 
sophisticated cognitive abilities will also have more incentive in collecting information, thus influencing the magnitude of 
the parameter a. In any case, a value of a equal to infinity will be taken to represent the limit situation of fully informed 
and perfectly optimising agents who immediately recognise in each period which is the best technique, and move towards 
it.  
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Under this general framework, various microeconomic accounts of firms’ actual individual 
behaviour and of the extent of cognitive and informational constraints are possible9. An interesting 
characteristic of the rule of motion set out in equation (12) is revealed by expressing it in terms of the 
share of capital: 
k
k
a k
•
=
+ - - i
i
i j i y y
c
( )( )( ) 1 1
        (13) 
It is now evident that a version of the replicator dynamics is implicit in the rule of motion of firms across 
techniques (Weibull, 1995). In fact, (yj-yi) is nothing but the difference in the rates of profit10. We can 
thereby conclude that the dynamics of the motion of firms across sector is grounded on the idea that 
firms imitate the agent of greater success on the basis of a slow process of diffusion of the information 
and limited cognitive abilities. 
2.4  Labour market 
Let LS define the overall level of the workforce present in the economy. Assuming that the 
population does not grow over time, we can with no loss of generality normalise this level to 1. The 
population is made up of two types of workers, skilled and unskilled, whose level is indicated by the 
variable s and (1-s) respectively. In this section I assume that workers cannot move across sectors, and 
this, together with the assumption that every worker supplies all of her endowment of labour, makes the 
level s fixed. It is helpful to introduce some notation for labour supply in a specific market:  
￿
￿
￿
= -
=
=
2 i    if        1
1    if             
s
i s
L
S
i         (14) 
Due to the off-equilibrium nature of the approach, a pair of equations describing the motion of 
prices in response to an imbalance in the market is needed. Labour demand will be determined by the 
firms’ level of capital, which yields the following linear relation: 
           
c a
K
L x
i
i D
i i = ”          (15)   
In the first instance, we assume a simple linear relation between the proportional growth rate of wages 
and the imbalances in the labour market: 
( )
S
i i
i
i L x
w
w - =
•
g          (16) 
g is a parameter expressing the speed with which imbalances on the labour market affect wages: in the 
hypothesis of instantaneous market clearing, this parameter would be equal to infinity.  
However, I will add to this relation another term measuring the impact of redistribution policies 
that are carried out “externally” to the market:  
                                                 
9 A second account that would be consistent with equation (12) would be one in which fully informed and perfectly rational 
agents, though unable to make forecasts over the future so that their horizon only spans the current period, face delays in 
the transfer of capital from one sector to the other. In this case, a would then measure the speed at which capital can be 
scrapped in one sector and reinvested in the other sector. 
10 Not surprisingly, the argument can be easily restated in the language of Game Theory: a, the parameter relative to the 
degree of information present in the economy, may be seen as depending on the probability of being chosen at random 
from the group of firms and matched with another firm. The difference (yj-yi) is the differences in the payoffs currently 
earned by the two “players”, thus representing the incentive to adopt the alternative technique in the circumstance it is 
performing better: in this case the alternative strategy best fits the environment, meaning a higher rate of “reproduction” 
of the technology.   
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The parameters bi may be thought of as the result of a bargaining between the relevant groups of 
agents present in the economy over income distribution. It is indeed clear that its introduction alters 
both the distribution of income between labour and profits and between the two wages with respect to 
that obtained through the market, allowing a sort of “guaranteed” increase in wages11. Therefore, it is 
perhaps more convenient to express it in terms of the increase in labour productivity, as it happens in 
“real” bargaining over income distribution: 
i i g b h =     h‡0      (17)   
Therefore, in this specification parameter bi represents the share of productivity gains accrued to 
labour income independently from market interactions. As we shall see, the value assumed by parameter 
h will be crucial in order to determine whether the evolution of the system reaches a situation of 
structural unemployment or not.  
A further constraint regards profits: the following condition allows for the fact that firms would 
temporarily shut down their activities when experiencing negative profits:   
1 0 £ £ i y           (18) 
Clearly, when yi, hits the boundary level of 1, wage growth could not exceed productivity growth, 
since claims from workers to get wage increases above that level could not be accommodated by firms 
just breaking the even. This constraint, along with equations (2) and (8), yields the final expression for 
the law of motion of yi: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) { } ￿ ￿
￿
￿
￿
= - + -
< - + -
=
•
1     1 , 0 min
1                 1
i i i
S
i i
i i i
S
i i
i
i
if y g L x
if y g L x
y
y
k h g
k h g
     (19) 
The actual level of employment will obviously be the minimum between labour demand and supply. 
Indicating such variable with Li, we have: 
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
=
S
i
D
i i L L L , min           (20) 
2.5  The behaviour of the system when labour demand is rationed 
The explicit introduction of labour market requires an amendment of what outlined above 
regarding the rules of capital accumulation. In fact, the possibility of having an excess of labour demand 
over supply implies that a fraction of capital is actually left idle, and of course this will affect both the 
level of profits and of investments.  
More precisely, suppose labour demand is in excess, so that only the fraction of capital that can be 
matched with labour supply is employed in production. The rest is unproductive, because of the perfect 
complementarity between labour and capital associated with the Leontief technology. Let K
E
i be the 
amount of capital effectively being employed, while Ki is the overall amount of capital present in a sector, 
but not necessarily employed. K
E
i will be given by the following expression: 
                                                 
11 The reader may have noticed that in such a specification the wages law of motion is formally equivalent with a Phillips 
curve relationship, where the NAIRU is given by the expression 
g
i S
i
b
L - .  
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More generally, we can define the ratio of capital actually employed over the total as: 
￿
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       (22) 
The variable ui will be called the capacity utilisation of capital in sector i. When labour supply is in 
excess there will be no rationing, leading to full utilisation of capital, represented by a value of 1 for such 
a variable. When labour demand is in excess ui will take on values less than 1. Therefore, in situations of 
rationing, a percentage (1- ui) of firms present in sector i is unable to undertake any productive activity. 
These firms will offer higher wages than the current one, thus hoping to attract workers currently 
working for other firms in order to enter the market. This has the effect of raising the level of wages in 
accordance with equation (20).  
The eventuality of rationing affects both the levels of profits and investments, as these quantities 
are determined by the capital that is actually being employed. Therefore, the foregoing expressions for 
the growth of capital must be corrected to take into account its possible rationing. One finds that the 
overall rate of profit, which is equal to the overall rate of growth of capital, is now given by: 
2 2 1 1 1 1 ) 1 ( r u r u r
K
K k k - + = =
•
       (23) 
where, as stressed above, the rates of profit in each sector are computed in terms of effective capital: 
E
i
i i i
i K
L w Q
r
-
=           (24)   
This is the quantity that firms actually use when comparing their current level of profit and that made 
possible by the alternative technique. Analogously, the growth rate of capital in each sector will be given 
by: 
    ( ) [ ]
c
y u y u
r r u r u
K
K j i j i i i
i i i i
i
i ) 1 )( 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 1 - - - - - +
= - + =
•
k a k a
a       (12’) 
which of course boils down to equation (12) when both u1 and u2 are equal to 1. Equation (13) is subject 
to an analogous change: 
[ ]
c
y u y u j j i i i i ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 ( - - - - +
=
•
k a
k
k
     (13’) 
3  The model with no mobility of labour 
3.1  An economic insight into the model 
The dynamics of the model set out above can be represented by a non-autonomous system of 
differential equations in the six variables representing the dynamics of each sector, i.e. productivity, 
capital, unit cost of labour. However, letting x1 and x2 substituting for K1 and K2 , and introducing k1,  
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whose value is indeed determined by x1 and x2, we can keep out productivity and reduce the system to 
an autonomous 5-dimension system. This is what obtains in the interior of the space:  
 
[ ]
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The dynamics forces driving the model can perhaps be better appreciated if they are considered each 
in turn: 
A)  Productivity: Productivity levels are one of the determinants of the relative profitability of the two 
techniques. It is affected by the concentration of firms in a sector because of the positive 
externalities gained through knowledge spillovers. This process determines a peculiar phenomenon 
of cumulativeness in technical change, since once an economy “specialises” in a technique, that is to 
say allocates a large share of capital in a sector, it becomes increasingly difficult for the other sector 
to bridge the productivity gap. 
B)  Wages: The intensive use of a certain technique brings about an increase in the associated level of 
employment, which in turn increases wages and reduce profitability. 
C)  Skill shortage: This factor refers to a structural characteristic of the economy, given by the condition of 
relative abundance of the workforce in each market. As outlined above, if the labour supply 
associated with a particular technique is relatively scarce then the excess of labour demand will bid 
wages up.  
These three factors can have a counterbalancing effect on each other; particularly, the wage effect 
and the possible presence of skill shortages of skilled labour might slow down, or even impede the 
economic system from converging towards the efficient technology.  
In more detail, one can notice that the model is symmetric in the pairs of variables (x1,y1) and 
(x2,y2). Moreover, when capital is completely allocated in one sector (that is, k1=0 or k1=1) then the pair 
of equations that are now relevant “loses” every link with the other two equations. For instance, when 
k1=1, then equations (27) and (29) are “autonomous” from the other two variables and make up a “sub-
system” of equations that is known as Lotka-Volterra, or predator-prey, model. This two-dimension 
system of equations has been extensively studied both in the mathematical literature (Hirsch and Smale, 
1974) and in Economics (Goodwin, 1967). Its basic characteristic is to display a persisting cyclical 
behaviour in the two relevant variables (capital and cost of labour), because an excess of labour demand 
drives wages up, thus reducing the rate of profit and investment. In turn this decreases the level of 
production and employment, so that wages diminish and trigger a new phase of increase in investments. 
The virtue of this simple model is that it generates endogenous cyclical fluctuations around a trend within 
a model of growth. Hence, the system under exam looks like a generalisation of the predator-prey 
model, being a “combination” of two such models, and boiling down to one of them when converging 
to the boundary of the k1 axis.  
 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
3.2  Analysis of local stability 
The steady states of the system can be divided into three categories: convergence towards the high-
growth equilibrium, convergence towards the slow-growth equilibrium, and, finally, a balanced growth 
path between the two sectors of the economy. For convergence to a sector I mean the process which leads 
asymptotically to the state of complete allocation of capital – and, from section 4, of labour as well – 
within that sector. So, we shall observe one sector becoming the leading one of the economy, as its share 
in overall production continuously arises, and the other being confined to a residual role. The balanced 
growth path solution, instead, depicts a situation in which the two sectors grow at the same rate.  
An assessment of local stability is not possible for the first two categories of steady states, because 
the presence of some purely imaginary eigenvalues makes the system locally non-hyperbolic 
(Guckhenheimer and Holmes, 1990). Still, the numerical analysis that I have conducted, part of which is 
reported in section 3.3, shows that all of such solutions look like attractors of the system under some 
values of the parameters. Instead, the solution associated with the balanced growth path can be 
immediately proved to be unstable by local stability analysis. In what follows the three types of steady 
states will be presented in more detail.  
3.2.1  High-growth steady states 
A1)  ( ) ( )
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This solution is characterised by complete allocation of capital into the efficient technique. It holds 
under the condition that h be greater than 1, thus it implies a positive level of unemployment for skilled 
labour and full employment for unskilled labour. One can also notice that a greater speed of adjustment 
in labour market, as measured by coefficient g, helps to reduce the level of unemployment, which at the 
limit is then equal to zero. Moreover, when a also goes to infinity, which corresponds to the case of 
perfect information and rationality of the agents (see section 2.3.2), the profit rate in sector 1, 1 - y1 , 
equates that of sector 2, 1 – y2, thus making firms indifferent between the two sectors. This state seems 
indeed to reflect a typical ‘neo-classical’ equilibrium, where labour markets clear and all sectors of the 
economy have the same level of profitability, though all the activities are concentrated in the first sector. 
Hence, the introduction of non-instantaneous market clearing and limited information within the model 
brings about structural unemployment and a persistent gap in the two sectors profit rates.  
Another steady state characterised by convergence towards the first sector obtains: 
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This was found under the limitation that h<1, thus it implies full employment of labour and rationing 
of capital in the first sector, and full employment of both capital and labour in the second technique (see 
eqs. 41-42).  
3.2.2  Low-growth steady states  
We also find a couple of steady states symmetrical to those just found, though they are 
characterised by convergence towards the second sector: 
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Solution (B1) is an equilibrium with “structural unemployment” in the leading sector of the economy, 
that is sector 2, and full employment of both inputs in the residual one; again this solution holds under 
the restriction that h is greater than 1. Conversely, solution (B2) predicts an outcome with full 
employment of labour in both sectors, under the condition that h is less than 1. The properties of 
stability of these steady states are the same as those found out for the case of convergence towards the 
first sector. 
3.2.3  Balanced growth path 
This is the only steady state in which both technologies coexist: 
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Notice that such a steady state is not constrained by any limitation to parameter h: it can thus 
depict both a situation of full employment of labour or of structural unemployment, boiling down to no 
unemployment when g=0. It is easy to show that for this value of k1 the productivity remains constant 
across the two sectors; the other values ensure that labour markets clear, so that there is no tendency for 
the system to move away from such a configuration. Since both sectors evolve according to the same 
growth rate, the economy can be said to follow a balanced growth path. Nevertheless, an analysis of its 
local properties of stability shows that such an outcome is in fact unstable (see section 6.1). The 
economic reason is to be found in the property of cumulativeness of technical change: if this state is 
perturbed even slightly, then the sectoral productivity will differ, thus attracting some firms to move to 
the more profitable technique. As a consequence, the sector that by chance happens to be the more 
profitable will experience positive sectoral economies of scale that will suffice to break the balance 
between the two profit rates.  
3.3  Analysis of global stability 
Due to the complexity of the model, a thorough global investigation of the properties of the system 
is not possible. Therefore, using  a specifically designed programme for Maple V, I have worked out a 
series of numerical analyses to test the behaviour of the system. The interested reader can find some 
notes in the last section of the Appendix. Overall, the main conclusion one can draw is that all of the 
above dubious cases of steady states turn out to be stable equilibria of the model for some values of the 
parameters. In what follows I shall highlight some of their features. 
3.3.1  First scenario: convergence towards the inefficient technology in the presence of a 
marked skill shortage 
First, I consider a situation where the condition of skill shortage is quite marked, as the economy 
starts off from a position where two thirds of the population are unskilled; that is to say, s=1/3. Besides, 
I also assume that the initial situation is one of initial perfect symmetry for all of the other variables, 
such that the two techniques are equitably profitable, and firms are equally distributed across them12. 
This should be appropriate for a situation of absolute ignorance over the properties of the techniques at 
                                                 
12 The particular values for the parameters have been chosen consistently with works by Silverberg and Verspagen (1994) – 
for what concerns a, the degree of individual rationality and information - and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1996) – for the 
capital output ratio c and sectoral growth rates g1 and g2 : 
a=1; g1=0,04,  g2=0,02; c=3; g=0.5; s=1/3; h=1. 
The set of initial conditions is meant to depict a situation of even distribution of firms across the two sectors: 
k1(0)=0.5; y1(0)=0.5; y2(0)=0.5; x1(0)=0.5; x2(0)=0.5 ; a1(0)=1; a2(0)=1  
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the beginning of the “story”. Moreover, parameter h, the key to income distribution, is assumed to be 
greater than one. Therefore, the feasible steady state between those listed in section 3.2 would be 
solution (B1).  
The main result is that the system converges asymptotically to the slow-growth steady state, as all 
capital becomes invested into technique 2 through a series of periodical oscillations that progressively 
dampen down (Figure 3.1). The reason can be investigated by looking at the behaviour of productivity 
growth rates. Technique 1 starts off with a higher productivity, as a result of the even distribution of 
firms across technologies at instant 0 (figure 3.2). However, firms become soon attracted by the 
possibility of hiring cheap labour in the unskilled labour market, thus boosting technique 2’s 
productivity. Hence, after few periods, the productivity in the second sector leapfrogs the other, and this 
is sufficient in order to determine a form of technological lock-in towards the second technique.  
It is worth noticing that the first sector does not completely disappear over time: as Figure 3.3 
shows, production growth rate settles on a 0-growth path on average, in which the flow of firms moving 
to the more profitable sector is exactly compensated by the flow of new investments into this sector. 
This is the sense in which we can call this sector the residual one of the economy. The overall growth rate 
tends to stabilise over the same growth rate as that of the leading sector – sector 2, that is - but the 
individual growth of the individual sectors show much widest fluctuations, which partly offset each 
other because of their different periodicity.  
The subsequent diagrams depict the dynamics within the labour market in the leading sector; that 
of the residual sector is similar thus it will not be commented. Employment and unit cost of labour 
settle on a cyclical path (Fig. 3.4). In the long-run, their trajectory converges towards a limit cycle, typical 
of  Lotka-Volterra systems (Fig. 3.5). Notice that the coordinates of the centre of the cycle correspond 
with solution (B1), once the parameters have been assigned their numerical values13. While the first 
sector periodically experiences phases of full employment, a state of structural unemployment in the 
leading sector of the economy occurs. 
One may question the reason why the two markets do not clear, even in the presence of flexible 
prices. In general terms, this is the result of the non-instantaneous adjustment in the labour market (see 
discussion in section 3.2). However, there is a further reason, related to income distribution. Provided 
that techniques have by construction fixed coefficients of production, firm labour demand will depend 
on the level of wages only indirectly, by means of the following dynamical mechanism: a low level of 
wages triggers high profits and then high investments, thus increasing the stock of capital and the 
demand for labour, and vice versa. However, if the “institutional” redistributive component is too high, 
which is the case when h is greater than 1, then capital accumulation will be too low to match labour 
supply. On the other hand, as we shall observe in the following section, for values of h less than 1 we 
obtain full employment of labour, but this time it is a portion of capital that is left idle. Therefore, too 
large a share of income devoted to labour implies too slow capital accumulation, thus creating 
unemployment. Finally, Figure 3.6 shows the evolution of income shares over time.  
 
                                                 
13 Plugging in the value of the parameters, one then obtains that the trajectories should either orbit or converge towards 
the following set of values:    
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Figure 3.5 
 
 
Figure 3.6 
 
3.3.2  Second scenario: convergence towards the high-growth steady state with limited skill 
shortage 
In this section I only slightly alter two of the parameters with respect to the previous case. This has 
the effect of completely upsettting the previous outcome. First, the percentage of skilled workers in the 
population now shifts from a third of the previous case to forty percent in the present one, thus 
implying a less marked skill shortage - namely s=0.4. Moreover, parameter h takes on a value less than 1, 
namely 0.5, indicating a less favourable distribution for labour income. All of the other values are those 
indicated in footnote 12.  
w2 L2/Q 
w1L1/Q 
p/Q  
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As Figure 3.7 shows, convergence to the efficient technique now obtains. Accordingly, the 
analytical solution that is feasible for this setting is (A2)14. The individual and aggregate growth rates 
display the same behaviour as the previous case, but the roles are now inverted: it is the first sector that 
becomes the leading one, whereas the second sector dwindles to a zero-growth path (Figure 3.8). One of 
the distinguishing features of this case is that it is now capital that is rationed, while labour reaches full 
employment (Fig. 3.9 and 3.10). The presence of idle capital in this case as well as of unemployment in 
the previous scenario, is a typical characteristic of models of the Harrodian tradition, to which the 
present model is similar in that it precludes marginal substitution of factors of production. Finally, it 
can be noticed that all of the variables do not show the peculiar cyclical behaviour observed in the 
previous scenario, but tend instead to converge towards a point. This is due to the change in parameter 
h, which implies that the type of dynamics in the leading sector of the economy is that of a stable focus 
rather than a centre (see discussion in the Appendix, section 6.1). Figure 3.11 shows indeed that the 
variables in the leading sector display the spiralling behaviour typical of a focus.  
 
 
Figure 3.7 
                                                 
14 This solution reads as follows after having substituted for the values of the parameters: 
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Figure 3.8 
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Figure 3.10 
 
Figure 3.11 
4  The case of labour mobility 
4.1  Extension of the model 
Let us now assume that workforce can be transferable from one sector of the economy to the other. 
Therefore, labour supply in each sector is no longer fixed, but is a function of time: 
        (31) 
The normalisation to one of the whole of the workforce has again been adopted; furthermore, s(t) 
denotes the percentage of the population of workers supplying labour on the skilled market as a 
function of time t.  
y1 
x1 
L1S  
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Generally, the skill upgrade for a worker demands some costs due to the necessity of increasing her 
stock of human capital. We shall assume that the distribution of "abilities" in the population is not 
homogeneous, but follows a uniform distribution on the interval [0,1], where the ranking goes from the 
ablest individual (s=0) to the least able (s=1). The cost of upgrading is determined accordingly by means 
of a function called m1(s), which is convex and monotonically increasing:  
         (32) 
In this version, the cost of the upgrade is nil for the ablest worker and infinite for the least able, and the 
function is monotonic increasing. Notice that in this model the “ability” of a worker is not related with 
whether she has acquired the status of skilled, but with the ease with which such a change can be carried 
out. 
Following an idea put forward by Blinder and Choi (1990), we can think that there also exists a 
"psychological" cost for the downgrading, since a worker who has started her career in the advanced 
sector is likely to experience a loss of social status. We can therefore assume a cost function for the 
downgrading symmetrical to the previous one: 
       (33) 
An example of the two costs function is given in the following diagram, which assigns a higher 
relevance to the “material” cost of upgrading with respect to the psychological one of downgrading: 
 
Figure 4.1 
Let us assume that the utility function of the worker is linear in the wage and in the transfer cost. At 
each instant of time, she faces a binary decision as to whether stay in the current sector or move to the 
alternative one. She must then compare the expected utility gained in each sector, taking into account 
the mobility costs and the possibility of being unemployed. Let as assume that the probability of being 
left unemployed is proportional to the current unemployment rate, and that workers know the current 
m1(s) 
m2(s)  
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levels of the unemployment rates in both sectors15. Therefore, given that the worker with ability labelled 
as s is currently working in sector i, her utility function will be given by: 
    (34)   
where, recalling the notation already introduced, Li/L
S
i and Lj/L
S
j stand for the unemployment rates in 
the two sectors. Hence, a worker will decide to move to the alternative sector if the associated expected 
utility, net of the costs associated with the change of skill, exceeds the expected utility earned by 
remaining in the current sector. Even in this setting, I shall assume bounded rationality, so that 
information diffuses slowly and follows a process of the replicator dynamics type. Accordingly, the rate 
of change in the composition of the workforce is proportional to the difference between the utility 
earned in the two sectors, where the constant of proportionality represents the speed with which 
information diffuses, the probability of being selected for a random matching that is (see section 2.3.2). 
In order to avoid unnecessary complications, I assume that the first workers to move across sectors, if 
convenient for them to do so, are those being at the “margin” of the markets, that is, the currently least 
able in the case of a shift from the skilled to the unskilled labour market, or the ablest in the case of a 
movement in the opposite direction. Therefore, the following rule of motion obtains: 
   (35) 
As pointed out earlier, b measures the speed with which information is made available to agents, and 
their degree of rationality in processing this information is also taken into account by means of the 
difference in utilities. 
Equation (35) forms a system of seven differential equations together with equations (27)-(30) and 
the two rules for productivity growth rates given by equation (2). As wages depend directly on 
productivity, it is no longer possible to make the system autonomous by means of the introduction of 
the auxiliary variable k1.  
4.2  Analysis of local stability 
Analysing the local stability of the steady state is now complicated by the presence of an additional 
equation and by the overall greater analytical complexity of the system. In order to make the derivation 
of some results possible at all, I first set the transfer costs ì1 and ì 2 in equation 35 equal to 0, which 
permits a significant simplification of the expression to the following one: 
      (35’)     
                                                 
15 In this I am abstracting from the possibility that the probability of unemployment is proportional to the worker's level of 
ability. Also, the assumption that agents know the unemployment rate may seem to be at odds with the assumption of 
imperfect rationality and bounded rationality. The results we obtain, though, do not hinge upon this hypothesis.   
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In fact, on the grounds of the simulations that I have conducted, such costs only appear to have a key 
role in determining which of the steady states will be reached, but they do not seem to affect their 
nature.  
Introducing some other minor simplifications, we can thus find the set of steady states for the 
system. It would be tedious to report all of the results of the analysis. The interested reader may find 
more information in the Appendix (section 6.3). I will limit here to summarise the main results that can 
be drawn.  The most important conclusion is that the nature of the model does not seem to be affected 
by the inclusion of labour mobility. In fact, the steady states found for the previous model with no 
mobility of labour simply ‘carry over’ to the present setting. More precisely, for each steady state found 
in the previous model there exists a steady state in the present setting whose values coincide, apart from 
an exception, once the steady state value for the variable s, which was a parameter in the former model, 
has been substituted. For instance, solution (A1) of the previous model has a ‘nearly-twin’ solution here:  
(D1)     
In fact, all of the steady state values in (A1) are identical to those of (D1) once s=1 has been 
substituted into the expressions of (A1). The only difference is that in the present setting y2  is 
undetermined. Furthermore, the steady state corresponding to the balanced growth path (C1) is also 
unstable. Moreover, the extra steady states in the latter version which do not match any of the previous 
all turn out to be unstable.  
Even in this setting, therefore, steady states are found in which there is complete allocation of the 
resources of the economy, be it capital or labour, into one single sector, which is the same for both 
factors. The conclusion that one could draw is thereby that market forces are sufficient in order to drive 
both resources to the same sector, thus avoiding the possibility of skill mismatches between the 
technological requirements and the workforce qualifications. Nevertheless, even in this setting they do 
not suffice to co-ordinate the agents on the efficient technology. In other words, labour seems to behave 
in the same way as capital, despite the presence of switching costs that were not assumed for capital: the 
long-run outcome must be the complete shift of workers into the technique that becomes the leading 
one in the economy, the reason being that both workers and firms ultimately become attracted by the 
higher earnings that can be made in the leading sector of the economy. The following section reports 
some results of the simulations that have been conducted, focussing in particular on the role of 
adjustment costs on the determination of the long-run outcome.  
4.3  Third and fourth scenarios: skill shortage and high vs. low costs of skill 
upgrading 
First, we need to specify a functional form that can be used to represent the skill-upgrading costs. I 
shall employ a logarithmic form: 
          (36) 
l1 is a parameter determining the magnitude of the upgrade costs: the higher the parameter, the 
higher the cost for every member of the population to improve their skill. 
We shall then assume a function symmetric to the previous one for the downgrading cost: 
          (37) 
The parameter values and initial conditions are such that the system starts with quite a marked skill 
shortage as in scenario 1, and with an upgrading cost relatively much higher than the downgrading cost.  
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All of the other conditions denote again a situation of initial symmetry between the two sectors16. The 
main upshot is that even in this case a result of convergence towards the slow-growth steady state 
obtains, which portrays a dynamics for the distribution of investments across sectors quite similar to 
that of the first scenario (Fig. 3.1). The underlying causes are the same as those stressed for the previous 
ones. In addition, productivity affects wages in such a way that workers are attracted to what soon 
becomes the leading sector of the economy, as shown by figure 4.2. The picture shows how the flow of 
labour is related to the wages differential. Therefore, productivity growth acts as the main factor to 
attract resources allocation both for capital and labour. According to the simulations conducted, this 
seems to be a general result, so that one could conclude that there is no risk of mismatch between 
labour demand and supply within this model. That is, a situation where capital and labour are allocated 
in the two different sector17, is avoided. However, what cannot in general be impeded is, again, a lock-in 
effect to the inefficient technique.  
An interesting feature of the model is its sensitiveness to the structure of the economy, and in 
particular to the magnitude of the skill upgrade costs. Indeed, it is sufficient to slightly shift the value of 
the related parameters to reverse the result of convergence towards the inefficient technique. In fact, 
after considering a set of parameters identical to the previous one but for the parameter l1, which is 
now shifted to a lower value (0.975 instead of 1) denoting a lesser transfer cost for skill upgrading, we 
obtain a result of convergence towards the first sector, analogous to that obtained in the second scenario 
(Figure 3.7). 
 
 
Figure 4.2 
5  Conclusions 
A model of growth with multiple steady states has been developed, which depicts the evolution of 
an economy characterised by localized technical change, i.e. spillovers taking place only at the technique-
specific level, bounded rationality, which determine a replicator-type dynamics for aggregate behaviour 
of agents, and non-instantaneous market clearing. On the grounds of the local stability analysis and the 
                                                 
16 In particular: {a:=1;c:=3; g1:=1; g2=1; b=1;h:=1.5; g1:=0.04; g2:=0.02; l1=1, l2= 0.1} {y1(0)=0.5; 
y2(0)=0.5; x1(0)=.5; x2(0)=.5; a1(0)=1; a2(0)=1; s(0)=1/3}. 
17 In fact, many of the additional steady states that can be found in the labour mobility version of the model display firms 
entirely concentrated in one sector of the economy and labour in the other. However, these steady states turn out to be 
unstable from a preliminary analysis.  
 w1 - w2 
s  
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simulations conducted, a high and a low-growth steady states, in which all factors are allocated to the 
skilled and unskilled-intensive technique respectively, obtain as stable equilibria of the model. A 
balanced growth path steady state, characterised by both sectors growing at the same rate, turns out to 
be unstable, because of the cumulative process of technical change. Some structural conditions 
determining the outcome of convergence have been highlighted, such as the degree of skill shortage in 
the case of non-transferability of labour, and the extent of skill upgrading costs in the case of labour 
mobility. 
The low-growth steady state may be interpreted as the result of a co-ordination failure amongst the 
variety of agents making up the economy, i.e. workers and firms: both outcomes in which all agents 
converge towards the same sector are indeed ‘equilibria’ of the interaction, but the co-ordination on the 
high-growth equilibrium Pareto-dominates the other. In other words, in this world of gradual 
adjustment towards equilibrium and optimality and slow diffusion of information, market forces suffice 
to impede the mismatch of productive factors, but they do not always provide enough incentives to 
converge towards the efficient outcome. This in particular is the case when adverse initial structural 
conditions for the economy occur. 
The analysis conducted has some straightforward, but significant, implications of political economy. 
In fact, a policy of training the unskilled work force, softening the initial skill shortage and lowering the 
skill upgrade costs, would make it possible to overcome the sub-optimal outcome. However, since the 
transition from the inefficient to the Pareto-efficient outcome requires some groups to give up part of 
their income shares in order to pay for the costs of the policy, in exchange of a benefit in the future, 
then some form of intertemporal agreement between the parties is necessary to guarantee the 
undertaking of the plan. As we all know, this is far from an easy requirement, though, especially in less 
developed countries where institutions are typically rather unstable. In more general terms, the paper 
stresses the complexity of a process of catching-up in presence of adverse structural conditions: even 
when a potentially more efficient technology is available in an economy, a lack of skill by the agents, 
concerning both workers as to their capacity to adapt to that technology, and firms as to their ability to 
exploit it, may thwart the economic incentives necessary to undertake the high-growth path. 
 
6  Appendix 
6.1  Analysis of the Steady States for the case of non-mobility of labour  
A1)   
The stability analysis is complicated by the fact that the variable x2 is located just on the threshold 
level where the related equation (30) changes its expression. This implies that the Jacobian on the right 
neighbourhood of the point differs from that of the left neighbourhood. On the left neighbourhood of 
, where both u1 and u2 equals 1, we get the following set of eigenvalues: 
       (38) 
Intuitively, the negative eigenvalue can be associated with the  1 axis, indicating the profitability of 
allocating capital in sector 1. Furthermore, two pairs of purely imaginary eigenvalues are obtained. Even 
though their sign is dubious, for the range of parameters economically meaningful we can be sure the  
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argument of the square root is actually negative. In fact, gi must have an order of magnitude at least 10 
times smallest than the value of the other parameters, and this ensures in particular that 
1 1 < - i cg           (39) 
From linear stability theory we know that a two-equation linear system having a couple of purely 
imaginary eigenvalues is a centre. However, this conclusion does not necessarily carry over to non-linear 
systems. If this was the case, nevertheless, we may think that each couple of eigenvalues actually 
describes the dynamics of each of the two sectors, so that labour demand and wages should display the 
cyclical behaviour typical of a centre.  
In the right neighbourhood of x2, when u2<1, we find the following set of eigenvalues: 
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    (40) 
It is notable that the negative eigenvalue and one of the two couples of imaginary eigenvalues coincide 
with what found for the left neighbourhood. Conversely, we now have a couple of complex conjugate 
eigenvalues with negative real part, whose dynamics would then be that of a stable focus generating 
trajectories that converge spiralling to a point.  
We can indeed be sure, by means of analytical considerations, that the couple of purely imaginary 
eigenvalues that remain unchanged in the two neighbourhoods can be associated with the first sector. In 
fact,  looking at the system of differential equations (26)-(30), one can notice that once k1 is equal to 0, 
as is the case asymptotically, then the second sector becomes “autonomous” from the variables of the 
first sector, thus assuming the form of a Lotka-Volterra two-equation system. Hence, the variables of the 
second sector must asymptotically behave like a centre, and converge towards a limit cycle. That this is 
the case can be derived from picture 3.5.  
As for the first sector, the presence of different pairs of eigenvalues in the two neighbourhoods of 
the solution, which would generate different dynamical behaviour if taken singularly, makes it 
impossible to state their dynamical behaviour with certainty. The most likely conjecture, also supported 
by some further evidence derived from graphical analysis not reported here, is that variables of the first 
sector oscillate on a torus, although possible behaviours would also be those of a limit cycle with a 
slower process of convergence than the second sector, and a strange attractor, i.e. a behaviour 
characterised by chaotic evolution within a limited manifold. 
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The properties of stability of the point must again be conducted considering two different sets of 
eigenvalues. In the left neighbourhood of 
S L x 2 2 =  we shall observe: 
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In the right neighbourhood the eigenvalues are as follows:  
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Hence, even in this case we have three eigenvalues that remain the same in both neighbourhoods, which 
are possibly associated with the k1 axis and with the variables of the leading sector. However, instead of 
having two couples of imaginary values we find a pair of complex conjugates eigenvalues: this leads us 
to think that the variables in the first sector converge spiralling to a focus, as displayed in Fig. 3.11. As 
in the previous case, we have a couple of imaginary eigenvalues on one side and a pair of stable complex 
conjugates on the other for the residual sector: this is a dynamic behaviour not easily classifiable, alike 
that found for solution (A1). 
I will not deal with the analysis of steady states (B1) and (B2) presented in section 3.2.2 since they 
are symmetric to solutions A1 and A2. 
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The analytical expression of the set of eigenvalues for steady state (C1) relative to a balanced growth path is 
rather complicated and will not be reported. For an economically reasonable set of parameters, however, one 
obtains the following set of values, where I is the purely imaginary unit: 
   
Intuitively, we can associate the 4 complex eigenvalues that can be found to the variables related to each 
sector –labour demand and labour unit cost. The positive eigenvalue can instead be associated with the 
k1 co-ordinate, on the grounds of economic consideration set out in section 3.2.3.  
6.2  Analysis of steady states for the case of labour mobility 
As already pointed out, the analysis of local stability for the case of labour mobility reveals the close 
similarity from the economic standpoint between the steady states found in the two cases. However, the 
reader interested in the mathematical details may want to explore the peculiarities of this, more complex, 
case. In this section I thereby offer a brief summary of the results obtained. 
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I have already noticed how clearly does this solution correspond with solution (A1) in that, apart from 
y2 being now undetermined, (A1) boils down to (D1) once the steady state value s=1 is substituted into 
the steady states values of the other variables. Since variable x2 is located on the edge of its admissible 
values, it obviously suffices to find eigenvalues only on the relevant neighbourhood of the space. The 
following set obtains: 
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No general conclusion can in general be drawn on the sign of the eigenvalues. However, some 
speculative considerations can be put forward. First, let us compare this with the set of eigenvalues  
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found for (A1): two of the purely imaginary eigenvalues coincide, once the value of s has been 
substituted; presumably, they are associated with the Lotka-Volterra dynamics setting in within the 
leading sector of the economy. The first two eigenvalues of (D1) have now a dubious sign. However, for 
a significant set of the parameters, and for y2  sufficiently close to 1, which on the grounds of the 
simulations conducted seems indeed to be the case, their values turn out to be negative. We finally have 
one negative eigenvalue, again for a realistic value of the parameters, and one equal to zero. Overall, 
therefore, this analysis cannot be conducive to any definite conclusion, because of the presence of 
eigenvalues with real part equal to nil. However, the simulations conducted prove indeed that this steady 
state turns out to be an attractor of the system, the two variables associated with the leading sector, x1 
and y1  that is, moving along a close orbit whose centre is that indicated in (D1), y2  converging to 1, and 
all of the other variables converging to the values prescribed in (D1).  
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Alike (D1), solution (D2), which holds under the constraints that ç is less than 1, has a corresponding 
solution in (A2) in that the latter obtains if one substitutes s=1 for the parameter s in (A2). The only 
difference lies in that y2 is undetermined in (D2), whereas it takes a definite expression in (A2). 
Assigning for simplicity y2 =1, which is the most likely value assumed by this variable in the residual 
sector of the economy, and the one actually observed in the simulations that have been conducted, the 
following set of eigenvalues obtains:  
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Interesting analogies with solution (A2) can be found here, too. The first pair of complex conjugates 
eigenvalues is identical to that found for (A2): this is likely to be associated with the dynamics in the 
leading sector of the economy, and indeed in the simulations I have conducted variables x1 and y1 show 
the typical behaviour of a focus. The other eigenvalues are either negative – in particular the latter is 
certainly negative as a1 in the long run outstrips a2 by a large amount – or equal to 0, which is likely to be 
associated with y2 . That this solution is indeed an attractor for the system has been verified through 
numerical simulations. 
Finally, symmetric solutions to the pair now illustrated, characterised by convergence to the second 
sector, can be found. These can be associated with solutions (B1) and (B2) for the same reasons set out 
above: 
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Not surprisingly, these steady states show symmetric properties of stability to those just examined.  
Finally, an equivalent solution to he balanced growth path solution (C1) seems to obtain even in 
this case, even though a complete analytical solution is not possible. However, after having assigned the 
numerical values used in the previous simulations to the parameters, one can express all the variables as 
a function of the particular value taken on by s. This solution looks indeed the exact analogous of 
solution (C1): 
  
 
  30
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
￿
￿
￿
￿ ￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ￿
￿
￿
» = - - - =
+
- + =
- - =
+
- + =
+
=
499 . 0
2399999998
1199999998 s     1 1       1    
   1       1      
2 1 2
2 1
2 1 2
2
2 1 1
2 1
2 1 2
1
2 1
2
1
g g s x
g g
cg g g y
g g s x
g g
cg g g y
g g
g
g
h
g
h k
 
Not surprisingly, this turns out to be unstable. 
 
6.3  Notes on numerical simulations 
The simulations have been conducted with the Maple V package. Due to a certain inflexibility of the 
Maple's built-in function to embed boundary conditions on the variables, I have set up the set of equations 
composing the Runge-Kutta algorithm (e.g. Hildebrand, 1987) - the same adopted in Maple. I then applied it to 
the system under investigation. Furthermore, during the simulations I have replaced the workers’ mobility costs 
functions specified in equations (36) and (37) with others having a constant, arbitrarily large, value in 
correspondence with their asymptotes.  
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